In February 2013, eleven Member States agreed to adopt the Commissions' Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, COM (2013)71 final. This article reviews three thematic areas frequently discussed by practitioners and academia alike on the impact that the Proposal could have on companies operating within participating Member States. This includes the impact on capital and related costs, business strategy and compliance considerations. I ask the question whether the unintentional repercussions could be mitigated by making adjustments to the current Proposal including the expansion of exemptions and the adoption of an implementation framework that takes inspiration from the Value Added Tax System that is already implemented across Member States.
Introduction

Background
Since 2008, the financial crisis has had a damaging effect on a number of economies around the globe. Much pressure has been placed on authorities to find a solution to the underlying causes of the financial crisis and take positive steps to avoid a repetition of the past.
Although the financial sector carried much of the blame, there were many factors which contributed to the financial crisis. 1 Many argue that the financial crisis was fuelled by excessive leverage and the property bubble. 2 Others note the effect of executive compensation which encouraged risk taking, the lack of sufficient regulation and supervision 3 and legislation that may have encouraged short term bias towards debt. 4 Presently, we still find ourselves asking why questionable tax policy has not be abolished. 5 Furthermore, the increase in lending credit, financial liberalisation, opacity and complexity may also have had a significant impact and are issues which require monitoring even today. 6 Whilst we find a number of individual country initiatives for improved regulation and fiscal reform, the European Union (EU) has pushed for a unified approach amongst Member
States. The EU felt strongly that it should 'lead efforts to set a global approach [...] with a view to maintaining a world-wide level playing field'. Member States agreed on the introduction of an EU-wide transaction tax on financial instruments. 13 As conflicts persisted, this prompted a call for last resort measures 14 which set in motion the procedure for enhanced cooperation amongst willing Member States. 15, 16 In The objectives of the Proposal focus on three core areas. 22 Firstly, it seeks to prevent fragmentation of the single market that could arise form uncoordinated approaches amongst Member States to tax the financial sector. Secondly, the Proposal seeks to ensure that the financial sector makes a fair and substantial contribution to public finances. Thirdly, the Proposal aims to discourage market transactions that do not contribute to the efficiency of financial markets or to the real economy.
The Proposal has found wide support from Oxfam, 
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The G-20 Toronto Summit concluded that that financial reform must ensure that the financial sector make a 'fair and substantial contribution towards paying for any burdens associated with government interventions' See The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration, Toronto, June 27, 2010. Available at: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/tocommunique.html. and European citizens. 27, 28 While those in favour of the Proposal see FTT as a tax instrument that could help to stabilize markets and reduce the likelihood of future crises, opponents fear that it may lead to a loss in trade, employment and growth and negatively affect the financial sector. 29 Banks and financial institutions have particularly voiced their concern that higher trading costs invoked by FTT may negatively affect their ability to compete internationally. 30 In the light of the Commission's stand to encourage greater harmonisation on financial transaction taxes and prevent uncoordinated approaches within the European Union, it is interesting to note the number of Member States that do in fact charge transaction taxes on financial instruments. Table 1 shows that a total of twelve Member States do implement transaction taxes on financial instruments, of which only six are signatory to the enhanced cooperation agreement for FTT. This conflicts to some extent with their decision not to support the Proposal. There exists, however, a number of differences between transaction taxes found in Member States and the Proposal itself; in terms of scope, tax rate and design, which makes choosing FTT far from straightforward. 31 The lack of harmonisation that is found within the European Union distorts the internal market and creates opportunities for tax arbitrage. These A survey carried out by Oxfam found that more than twice as many people supported FTT than those that opposed it in UK (51% vs 19%), Germany (53% v 24%), France (51% v 22%), Spain (67% v 15%) and Italy (59% v 18%). In the Netherlands 38% were in favour and 25% were Current transaction taxes across Member States vary and reflects the individual Member States' own particular fiscal policy and objectives. There are differences in terms of the treatment of transactions between groups, whether transaction taxes are charged in the case of mergers and acquisitions, and the scope of exemptions and deductions. Tax rates also vary. The Proposal, however, could potentially have a positive domino effect on other countries which may be inspired by the Commission's initiative. As more and more countries seek to introduce transaction taxes on financial instruments, for regulatory or revenue purposes, or both, they may feel justified in doing so on the back of the initiative taken by the Commission. The Proposal may therefore achieve its objective indirectly, even if in a piecemeal way. 
Alternatives to Financial Transaction Tax
The Commission has undertaken a number of discussions on how best to tax the financial sector. Discussions focused on selecting the appropriate tax instrument that could generate sufficient revenues and provide the appropriate steering effects. Such an instrument would need to focus on 'value added', be 'non-distortive', yet still meet 'equity objectives'.
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A number of alternatives were discussed including Financial Activity Tax (FAT), Financial Stability Contribution (FSC) and Value Added Taxation (VAT).
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Each alternative tax instrument is discussed hereunder, in the light of the Commission's choice to continue with FTT as its preferred means to tax the financial sector, which is discussed in detail in Section
FAT is a form of bank levy which is charged on 'the sum of the profits of financial institutions and the remuneration paid by them'.
39
The IMF 40 proposed three variants of FAT,
-FAT 1 based on a VAT like system without the right to deduct wages, FAT 2 which taxes financial sector rents and FAT 3 based on risk taking. In its report, the IMF outlines three alternative versions of the FAT, namely (i) the addition-method FAT, (ii) the rent-taxing FAT and (iii) the risk-taxing FAT. The report states that whereas the addition method taxes all profits and remuneration, the rent-taxing method taxes profit only above a certain amount, calculated based on the application for an allowance for corporate equity. Risk-taxing FAT is a step above rent-taxing FAT In practice it may be difficult to limit FTT to trading which is purely of a speculative nature. FSC specifically aims to ensure that the sector makes a contribution to resolution fund and reduce systematic risk.
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In line with this objective, FSC may accordingly be introduced either in a permanent or temporary manner. The impact of FSC will ultimately depend on the size of the tax base, but could potentially amount to 2% of GDP in some countries.
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The Commission has chosen not to make VAT on financial services offered by the financial sector mandatory and, as a result, most Member States opt to exempt The potential for revenue generation is substantial, even if deductions for VAT on inputs are taken into consideration.
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Some argue that it would be technically difficult to charge VAT on financial services.
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Technical issues, however, could be overcome. 73 The framework that already exists within the EU for administration and Furthermore, the application of VAT principles which exempts most transactions undertaken with persons in third countries, would also help to overcome the criticism levied against FTTs' extraterritorial effect (see Section 1.5.). Even though the potential for revenue generation under VAT might be quite substantial, full adoption of VAT is not, however, always convincing.
VAT may not be able to address the speculative nature of the transactions, which discourages changes to the present treatment of the financial sector. It is this lack of focus which makes VAT not the preferred means to tax the financial sector, and places FTT in a more preferential light. There are, however, some aspects that could inspire changes to the Proposal and provide a support framework for implementation that should not be overlooked. These issues are discussed further in Section 3.
In the alternatives discussed above, the main point of each tax instrument is to ensure that the financial sector makes a contribution towards tax revenues in a way which discourages distortive activities and provides revenue sources for authorities. Unfortunately the incidence is always likely to be passed on to end consumer in one way or another (see Section 1.4.).
Empirical research on tax incidence to identify which alternative would give rise to the least incidence of shifting is not available. The tax base for each tax instrument may help shed light on this issue, 74 but must still be considered within the perspective of elasticities of demand and supply. Ultimately the tax instrument selected must be fit for purpose. The Commission noted that the choice of a tax instrument had to fulfil three main criteria. Firstly, had to enhance the efficiency and stability of financial markets and reducing their volatility. Secondly, it had to contribute to fiscal consolidation and auxiliary resources as well as economic efficiency. Thirdly, as most financial services are VAT exempt, any instrument selected would need to make a fairer and more substantial contribution to government finances. See COM(2010) 549 final. Secondly, all instruments are subject to FTT which is charged on gross values, before netting and settlement. 85 Transactions subject to FTT include all purchases and sales, transfers between groups, conclusions of derivative contracts and exchange and repurchase agreements.
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The rate of tax is 0.01% on derivative contracts and 0.1% on other financial instruments.
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The Proposal does not solely focus on speculative trading, 88 which contrasts to some extent with the objectives of the Proposal (see Section 1.1.) as all trades, whether distortive or otherwise, will be subject to FTT. The rates established within the Proposal are minimum rates; as a result, Member States are free to set higher tax rates of tax. Other countries such as France and Italy make a distinction based on the type of trading undertaken which may be linked to speculative activities. Italy for instance taxes high frequency trades at a 0.02% separate tax rate while France taxes high frequency trades at 0.01%. Italy also taxes derivatives at separate rates.
89
They are unlikely to do so to ensure that tax competition between participating Member States does not arise.
Page 11 charged on both legs of a transaction, which doubles the effective rates of tax outlined within the Proposal. In the case of transactions other than derivatives, the taxable amount of FTT is based on consideration paid, 90 whilst transactions carried out between entities in a group are subject to market price considerations.
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The taxable amount for derivatives is the notional amount referred to in the derivative contracts.
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In all cases, tax is charged at the moment the transaction occurs.
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Financial instruments issued within a participating Member State are subject to FTT, regardless of the place where the transaction is undertaken. The latter is decisively at odds with the design of tax instruments in general. Such provisions mean that the Proposal makes a number of assumptions on transactions carried out in the financial sector. It assumes to some degree that all trades are pursued to completion, and if they are not, this reflects an intention to avoid tax payment, which may not be the case. Only errors are excluded from being subject to FTT.
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The wide net of the Proposal in this respect does act as an important tool against speculative trading by discouraging spoofing, 103 which causes volatility in market.
Implementation and administration of the Proposal rests with individual Member
States.
104
Little guidance however is provided in this regard which may cause implementation problems. The Proposal does, however, highlight that payment must be made within three working days, or immediately in the case of transactions undertaken electronically. Another aspect incorporated within the Proposal, which is not generally found in the other tax instruments, is the concept of joint and several liability. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission has opened a civil enforcement action in the US against Navinder Singh Sarao and his trading company Nav Sarao Futures Limited plc. He is accused of unlawfully manipulating, attempting to manipulate and spoofing the markets. Mr Sarao is accused of setting up deals in the E-mini S&P 500 stock market index future contracts which were not carried out but which created artificial volatility. This included placing orders which were cancelled and for which he had no intention to carry out. 
Incidence of Transaction Taxes
A primary objective of the Proposal is to ensure that the financial sector makes a 'fair'
and 'substantial' contribution towards covering the costs of the financial crisis. The United Kingdom used the so-called season ticket system to overcome some of the problem that could arise in attempting to ensure that foreign traders pay all domestic taxes. This, however, was found to be contrary to EU law and was later abolished. The objectives of the Proposal include obtaining a fair and substantial contribution for the costs of the crisis through the generation of sufficient tax revenues, while at the same time seeking to disincentivizing risky activities in the form of speculative trading by financial institutions operating in or through Europe. 
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It will also depend on the availability of domestic substitutes and investors attitudes towards investing abroad. Trading costs to enter foreign markets, particularly fixed costs, could sustain home bias. 119 The Mirrlees Report 120 on tax design noted that the incidence of taxation will in due course always fall on the owners (shareholders), customers or employees of any company subject to taxation. This may prove positive if we consider that wealthy individuals may hold a larger proportion of financial instruments than individuals in low and middle income groups. 121, 122, 123 The taxation of financial instruments could in this case be considered as progressive in nature if, in fact, the ownership and thus incidence of the tax did fall mainly on wealthy individuals. 124, 125 Others, however, query whether taxes on financial transactions could have an opposite effect. If taxes cause a barrier for individuals to enter financial markets, they not only lose the benefits of diversification but may also expose themselves to higher risks associated with the holding of cash. This would prove regressive in nature for individuals and thus have an opposite effect to what would be considered as a fair outcome of FTT. 
The (Extra)Territorial Effect of Financial Transaction Tax
The Proposal incorporates a number of important provisions to ensure that FTT, when implemented, is paid by all parties to a financial transaction. This is achieved through the extraterritorial effect of FTT that is derived from the application of both the principles of deemed establishment and issuance (see Section 1.3.). Briefly, the extraterritorial effect of FTT arises in the following manner. Firstly, a party to a financial transaction that is located outside a participating Member States is subject to FTT if the financial instrument that it is trading in was issued in a participating Member State (issuance principle). 
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State. By this act, they are deemed to be established in the jurisdiction of that counterparty. 128 This is known as the counterparty principle. 129 The counterparty principle and issuance principle together ensure that FTT is always paid on both legs of a transaction regardless of the location of the trading parties. It, however, makes us question if this may conflict with the principles of international public law.
International public law provides that jurisdiction to tax is based on the principles of residence and/or source based rules. These principles of taxation are based on a link or nexus (residence or source) existing between the taxpayer and the taxing jurisdiction. Conflicts arise with the application of FTT as counterparties to a financial transaction, who are not located in a participating Member State, are still subject to FTT. Such companies would in most circumstances be generally considered as only trading with the jurisdiction and not trading in the jurisdiction, and hence would not generally be subject to tax.
The Commission, in 2013, sought to clarify this issue by stating that a financial institution that trades with a counterparty located within a participating Member State is 'contributing to the achievement of a legally relevant result within that jurisdiction'. 130 In this way, a sufficient nexus with the jurisdiction is created, and therefore, according to the Commission, no conflict arises with international public law. Judgment of the ECJ of 31 March 1993 in joined cases C-89/85 and others, ECR 1993, Page I-01307. This case outlines the communities' jurisdiction in competition law. Wood pulp producers from Canada, Finland, Sweden and the USA were found to have created a cartel outside the European Union but which affect buyers in the European Union. The European Union brought about an action against the producers on the grounds that it infringed competition rules under Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 101 of the TFEU). The producers argued that the communities' jurisdiction could not extend to them and that the extraterritorial effect was contrary to the objectives of the article but the ECJ disagreed and upheld the position of the Commission. The need for FTT to have an extraterritorial effect must be balanced with the need to reduce the likelihood of tax avoidance. Like trading parties, they will consider the cost of doing business after the introduction of a new tax, and will look for ways how best to reduce their costs. Foreign direct investment to the participating Member States will be affected if traders opt to stay away.
Although subject to much criticism, the extraterritorial effect of FTT is also found in other taxes. A case in point is controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation. CFC legislation extends a country's taxing right where no distributions have been made by a foreign subsidiary to a resident shareholder. The extension of a country's taxing right to tax profits which have as yet not been distributed, is a significant anti-avoidance provision and is applied in a number of Member States, including the UK which is opposed to FTT.
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The UK has unsuccessfully challenged the Commission's right for FTT to incorporate an extraterritorial effect. This paper contributes to existing literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it highlights how FTT could impact companies operating within participating Member States. Secondly, the paper outlines key points that need to be considered to revamp the Proposal to reduce the distortive effect within the enhanced cooperation zone for FTT and to encourage adoption by non-participating Member States. This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 reviews the Proposal under three key thematic areas. Section 3 discusses how the Proposal could be revamped. Section 4 concludes this paper.
Impact of Financial Transaction Taxes
Capital
Transaction Cost and Cost of Capital Implications
Transaction costs typically include brokerage fees, administrative fees, commissions and transaction taxes. The introduction of FTT increases the cost of capital 141, 142, 143, 144 as financial instruments are subject to higher transaction costs. The significance of this exchange of information would also be welcomed at the European level in order to reduce tax evasion and fraud. The Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation (COM(2013) 348 final) seeks to achieve just that. Through this initiative, Member States would exchange information automatically, thereby extending the scope of existing exchange of information provisions to include dividends, capital gains, other financial income and account balances. Currently, the Savings Directive does fill a void in existing legislation regarding exchange of information by requiring Member States to levy a withholding tax where information regarding the recipient of interest income has not been submitted to the state of residence of the investment holder. is heightened by the important role that an efficient capital market plays within an economy, and how FTT could affect financial markets within participating Member States.
Indirectly, the extraterritorial effect of FTT will also affect financial markets in nonparticipating Member States if financial institutions continue to trade with counterparties located within the enhanced cooperation zone. The EU is, after all, home to some of the largest financial centres in the world, including the stock markets of London and Frankfurt.
As transaction costs increase, rational investors will seek compensatory returns 148, 149 if the cost of debt (risk free rate plus credit risk rate x (1 -rate of tax)) or equity (risk free rate of return + premium) increase. Ultimately, it is the number of trades which determines the extent to which FTT will affect the cost of capital. Assuming that international rates of return are given by R* where return in a country is = ( ) and is the value of the principle and is the dividend received in period t, if in one jurisdiction transaction costs have to be incurred, in equilibrium, the rate of return in this country must increase. The negative impact on portfolio diversification exposes investors to greater risk. Blackrock (AIMA, 2012) retrospective analysis of fund data shows that the annual cost of FTT would range from 0.01% to 2.57% in higher costs, depending turnover and investment. The results obtained by Oxera (Oxera Consulting Ltd (2011) p. iv.) were even higher (2.7% to 5.5%) when taking into consideration the cascading (see AIMA (2012)) for an illustrated example of the effect of cascading). These results were also supported the European Fund and Asset Management Committee in 2012 who also agreed on the likely outcome on liquidity and volatility. 
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The cost of the financial crisis has already strained government revenues, but FTT could also increase the borrowing costs of authorities as they access financial markets to borrow from the private sector.
Debt vs. Equity Financing
A tax on financial instruments would affect both debt and equity. According to the pecking order theory of finance, 159 the least costly source of finance are retained earnings, 160 followed by debt and then equity, in that order. This order may become distorted by the preferential tax treatment of debt. 161 Even without the pecking order theory, if investors or firms have a particular preference, the tax system should not bias their choice. Within the context of the Proposal, the differential rate of taxation between derivatives and non-derivative products may also give rise to further bias, whilst investors may also favour primary listings and government debt which are also exempt from FTT. The bias that may arise towards government treasury bills and bonds may not always be preferential. The effect of FTT on debt and equity financing is also amplified by the size of a company. When seeking to raise finance, larger firms may be affected more by FTT than smaller firms that are generally 'restricted to the loan market'. 164 Furthermore, FTT also affects working capital requirements of companies subject to FTT, and due consideration needs to be taken in this regard. Some have argued that any downsizing of the workforce could simply help to rebalance the allocation of labour within an economy. Well before the financial crisis even started, there was a view amongst some academics that the financial sector already contained excess labour resources.
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As employment in the sector grew, productive real activities suffered.
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Diverting human capital away from the financial markets back towards 'real' activities could prove beneficial to the overall economic growth of a country and help to counter balance the negative effects of FTT.
Asset Values
Both theory and empirical results shows that transaction taxes reduce after-tax asset values. 172, 173, 174, 175, 176 The empirical results (see Table 2 ) highlight that the effect on asset prices is consistent over time and in different markets. The discounting of future returns results in The permanent effect will be influenced by the rate of turnover and dividend yield of financial instruments. 178 If the Proposal is adopted, it will have an impact on both. 192 this may in turn free up management to look beyond the short term. 193, 194 In an FTT environment, frequent short-term trades negatively affect investment returns, and this places pressure on managers to adjust their investment strategies to reduce the cost of FTT. 195 This would affect both real and financial investments, as greater focus is placed on productive uses of resources by managers. 196, 197, 198 This, however, assumes that long-term planning time horizons are ignored, which may not be the case. A push to alter investment strategies will differ between companies as well as industries. Ultimately, 'genuine long-term expectation
[may be] so difficult ', 199 that it may not be practical for investors.
Relocation and Risk
Given the highly mobile nature of financial transactions, the Proposal seeks to reduce substitution and relocation by being broad in scope. 200 The Commission does, however, accept that relocation will nevertheless take place. 201 Financial institutions that seek to avoid paying 187 Summers, H. L., & V. P. its overall effect on speculation is not entirely clear. As shown in Table 3 , the impact that transaction taxes have had on market volatility varies, with regional and timing effects providing no indication of why transaction taxes do not always improve market stability. Many member states apply VAT grouping provisions to avoid charging VAT to the transfer of goods and services between group members in accordance with Article 11 of the VAT Sixth directive. Although VAT as an alternative to FTT has been side-lined, this does not mean that beneficial treatment established by the Sixth Directive itself should be entirely disregarded. The adoption of grouping provisions is recognized as an important cash flow management tool for groups. However, case law permits authorities to restrict the scope of VAT grouping provisions to intra-group transactions undertaken by associated companies located within the same Member State. The principles established by FCE Bank (Judgement of the Court (Second Chamber), 23 March 2006, Case C-210/04, Ministero dell' Economia e delle Finanze, v. FCE Bank plc.) would need to be extended to accommodate the highly global scope of FTT, although the argument for group exemptions solely within the Euro zone would require consideration of other factors, such as the application of treaty freedoms applicable to third countries. If policy makers are correct, and the Proposal does achieve its objective, a reduction in speculation may not necessarily be beneficial for participating Member States. The volume of financial transaction around the world have increased dramatically in recent years. In 2007, trade in financial instruments accounted for 70% of world GDP. 235 It is clear that any effort to reduce speculative trading will affect the marketability of shares 236 and reduce trading volumes. 237 What is uncertain is the extent to which volumes will be reduced. Any change in trading volumes will consequently affect liquidity. 238, 239 This is an important issue and may be to the way in which the tax is implemented, but its effect is reduced if market makers can produce enough liquidity in the market to compensate for this. 245 Further analysis of empirical results, focusing on the framework of the transaction tax being studied, could improve our understanding of how markets react. 246 This includes not only looking at how the tax was implemented but also looking at the underlying objectives of the transaction tax being studied.
Whilst transaction taxes inspired by Keynes and Tobin focus on market stability, 247, 248 revenue generation has been the main priority in many other transaction taxes. 249 This may make comparison difficult in some respects, even if the Proposal creates a new revenue stream for the European Union. 250 Another issue that needs to be addressed here is that FTT is not specific in its objective to target speculative trading. As a result, financial instruments used in everyday operations will also be affected given also the limited scope of exemptions available under the Proposal. 251 This will mean that derivatives which are used for hedging against business risk are still subject 
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The impact on repo transactions, commonly used for trading, has also generated concern as there are few alternatives to the use of repos for collateral purposes. but would also significantly increase the tax base of derivative instruments subject to FTT. Where realisation has not taken place, a lack of internal funds will require companies to seek third-party financing. This would be the case for all instruments subject to FTT, but the impact may be greater for derivatives given the significant notional value of such instruments. Furthermore, financing may not readily be available, or only available at a premium. The lower tax rate on derivative instruments does little to mitigate this drawback, other than creating an investment bias. Domestically groups may be subject to special tax considerations including exemptions or tax deferral, rollover relief and / or loss offset provisions, enabling groups to be treated as one economic unit for tax purposes. Within Europe, directives, such as the Merger and Acquisition Directive seek to remove fiscal obstacles in crossborder reorganizations while the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive seek to reduce the tax burden on cross border transfers between group members. Under FTT, group structures will be faced with an added burden, given that transactions may arise where no consideration changes hands and where, fundamentally, no purchase or sale may have arisen -See COM(2011) 594 final. Nevertheless, the transaction still attracts a tax charge, as well as accompanying compliance obligations. As a result, merger and acquisition decisions across Europe may still be distorted as companies look at the impact of FTT after reorganization takes place within participating Member States. FTT may thereby suffer the same criticism as has been levied on the impact that UK stamp duty taxes have on merger and acquisition decisions. The application of burification principles would benefit all trades subject to FTT. Page 31
The Proposal
Authorities may favour transaction taxes for a number of reasons. Transaction taxes are generally viewed as easier to administer, and less costly to collect especially when they are carried out electronically. 265 In the latter case, FTT also provides real time revenue flows to authorities.
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In addition, the broad scope of the tax would make it less susceptible to tax avoidance, making FTT technically 'feasible' and 'timely'. 267 But a number of compliance and administration issues make implementation of the current Proposal difficult. This includes a tax base which is not clearly defined, 268 whilst no definition at all exists on how entities operating with the enhanced cooperation zone will be considered as forming part of a group or whether for that matter how those located outside the zone will also be treated. Such as whether tax is due on the trade or settlement date.
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Although no beneficial tax provisions for groups are provided in the Proposal (other than in the case of reorganization), anti-avoidance provisions are specifically mentioned with respect to groups. In this regard transactions between group members should be undertaken at arm's length. In addition, the absence of harmonized anti-avoidance legislation across Europe (and internationally) in terms of the establishment of the arm's length principle may also give rise to implementation and administrative problems for companies operating within the enhanced cooperation zone. Groups will have to satisfy rules in multiple jurisdictions with varied and often complex compliance requirements. Neither companies nor authorities located within jurisdictions currently free of such anti-avoidance rules will be relieved of such obligations. The latter will only add to initial teething problems.
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Transaction taxes have traditionally been linked to the transfer of ownership. Under FTT all transfers, whether giving rise to transfer of ownership or not are now subject to FTT. This means that even intermediary transfers are taxable. This may give rise to considerable costs increasing the cascading effect of FTT. FTT will impose a tax and compliance burden on intermediaries who have generally not be subject to transaction taxes but who now will be required to have the appropriate framework in place.
Page 32 made, especially in the case of electronic transfers, this may pose practical problems for financial institutions. Notional values may also differ considerably from actual consideration paid. 272, 273 Necessity, the mother of all inventions, is equally applicable within the sphere of tax planning, and hence we will also see new instruments placed on the market by financial engineers. The use of factoring in derivative instruments will consciously increase given the lack of anti-avoidance provisions in this respect, although the 'robustness of the tax' has already been reviewed. 274 Swaps are particularly suited for factoring given that they lack any principle values. 275 The principle of 'substance over form' should apply to minimise evasion and avoidance, 276 but here too the sector can be very creative.
Technical problems may also hamper implementation. Concern have been raised regarding who will be responsible for tax payments in the case of custodian services and whether compliance requirements will also be imposed on them. 
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The complexity and innovative nature of the financial sector and the diverse range of instruments that exist may further add to implementation problems, especially where tax authorities lack sufficient staff and administrative technical support. As Braithwaite and   Wenzel   280 highlight, 'systems, no matter how elegant, rely on people to work, and if the assumptions made about people, either those who work as tax collectors or those who pay taxes, are incorrect, there is no reason for expecting that tax design by the gold standards will achieve the desired outcomes'.
Arguments in Favour of Standard Implementation Procedures
Member States will be made responsible for all administrative, accounting and There are also other advantages of using IT systems to administer FTT including reduced trading costs. The compliance cost with regard to UK stamp duty were found to be relatively less than the costs with regard to other taxes (Bond, 
Accounting and Audit Considerations
During the financial crisis the role of the accounting profession was questioned. 285 The widely held conclusion is that standards (fair value accounting) were unlikely to have contributed to the financial crisis. 286 However, a recurring theme during the debate on the role that the profession played during the crisis was the 'inconsistent implementation and subsequent misapplication of the standards by originators, securitizers, and investors'. 287 If FTT encourage new innovative financial products, than this will only add to the problem of less than perfect application of standards.
The future role of accounting standards, and the profession itself, has now been questioned. International standards may not be able to support innovative financial products that may develop in response to FTT. If accounting standards do change, the increase in complexity that we may observe may not necessarily add value to accounting statements. 288 The lengthy standard-making process further complicates matters. IFRS 9, 289 issued in 284 response to the need to update standards pertaining to financial instruments, may require further review if the Proposal is implemented. Future reform in the financial sector may also require accountants, and auditors, to take a more proactive role in supporting a more stable financial sector.
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How can the Proposal be Improved?
History has shown that corrective taxation should be undertaken cautiously as both the side-effects and deadweight losses could outweigh any benefits gained. 291 Claessens & Kodres, note that 'any financial system reform undertaken by policy makers, including new financial transaction tax, must take into consideration the financial system as a whole'. 292 Selected tax instruments must also be efficient and have the least effect on market behaviour. 293 The Proposal primarily aims to 'right a wrong' but empirical research show that transaction taxes have a wider impact than the objectives outlined by the Commission. The Proposal once implemented will have an effect on market behaviour, 294 both before implementation 295 and on the actual day it is introduced. Changes in market behaviour may not necessarily be a bad thing as it would be contradictory to the objectives of the Proposal if FTT did not influence trading behaviour. But it does far more than discourage inefficient trading and reduce market volatility. Table 4 compares the objectives as outlined by the Proposal and the potential unintentional consequences that may arise if the Proposal is implemented. The latter is based on the literature reviewed in this paper. Distortion will arise with implementation of the Proposal, and so too will the relocation of companies from participating Member States.
Above all the anti-speculative effect of the Proposal, is as yet, uncertain. In addition, implementation of the Proposal would give rise to higher trading costs, increase redundancies and dampen market liquidity which may all contribute to reducing the international competitiveness of companies operating in the enhanced cooperation zone. 1) and included reviewing principles for the classification and measurement of assets, impairment methods and accounting for hedging. The increasingly complexities of financial instruments will place increased pressure on the accounting profession. it is unlikely that the Commission will now change its position on adopting the Proposal. In this situation we must work within the framework of the existing Proposal and implement changes which could help foster outcomes that are more in-line with the intended objectives of the Proposal and that would encourage greater adoption across the board. Present discussions have focused on reviewing the scope of the Proposal and reassessing which instrument should be subject to FTT. In addition, there is growing emphasis that there needs to be a change to residence and issuance principles incorporated within the Proposal.
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This would reduce the extraterritorial effect of the Proposal and help to counteract any distortive effect that may arise. If changes to the Proposal are to be made, the Commission would do well to consider revamping the Proposal on a number of other key issues as well. It must also place greater emphasis on providing clearer guidance on specific areas to companies that will be affected by the Proposal. It is obvious that there are many aspects to consider, and there are many and divergent views on the way forward, but in light of the discussion above, If FTT is to be introduced by the beginning of 2017, the biggest question that now remains is how the Proposal is going to be implemented across companies operating in different jurisdictions. Previous alternative means to tax the financial services sector can provide inspiration for revamping the Proposal. The framework for implementation of VAT could provide added value to the Proposal and stream line processes for smoother implementation. It could also help to clarify a number of key issues such as providing a definition for group structures, and a framework for counterparty confirmation. The complexity and uncertainty that currently overshadows the Proposal is far too great for the Commission not to take a stand.
Notwithstanding that this paper has focused on the business perspective of the Proposal, the initial considerations of why FTT was first discussed should not be overlooked. Following the polluters pay principle, the tax seeks to overcome some of the drawbacks that the market cannot compensate for. A transaction tax may be the only way to reduce excess speculation.
Even if not proven in all cases, it does ensure that those who have contributed to the crisis pay, in some way, for the damages they have caused. Through its broad nature and the principle of extraterritoriality, the Proposal also ensures that companies that should pay, do, as there are very few opportunities to avoid the tax, if at all. FTT may not be entirely beneficial from a business perspective but may still have an important social role to play in regulating the market.
It may be a necessary constraint required by a market which has been found unable to restrain itself.
The impact of this innovative tax and whether or not it will be able to address the underlying objectives it purports to achieve has yet to be seen. If it misses its target it may cause more harm than good. Although the past is no guarantee of the future, history does have a habit of repeating itself. Can Europe weather another economic storm if it misses its mark?
